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Example
Example
A public bad, eg. nuclear plant, has to be located in some specific
area.
Each person regards one position (the “dip”) for this public bad as
the worst and would like the public bad to be located as far away
(Euclidean distance) from this dip as possible.
The dip is private knowledge.
Question
Is there a strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule that can be used
to determine the location of the public bad?
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Basic Model
• N = {1, . . . , n} (n ≥ 2) is the set of agents
• A ⊆ Rm (m ≥ 2) is set of alternatives
• Each a ∈ A can be identified with a (single-dipped) preference
Ra: for x , y ∈ A, xRay ⇔ ||x − a|| ≥ ||y − a||, where ||x − a||
denotes Euclidean distance between x and a
• A solution assigns to a profile of preferences a point of A:
f ((ai)i∈N) ∈ A, where a
i ∈ A for all i ∈ N
• f is Pareto optimal (PO) if for every profile (ai)i∈N there is no
a ∈ A such that ||a − aj || ≥ ||f ((ai )i∈N)− a
j || for all j ∈ N
with at least one inequality strict
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Basic Model
• f is strategy-proof (SP) if for every profile (ai)i∈N , every
j ∈ N and every bj ∈ A, we have:
||aj − f ((ai )i∈N)|| ≥ ||a
j − f ((ai )i 6=j , b
j)||
• f is intermediate strategy-proof (ISP) if for every S ⊆ N,
every profile (ai )i∈N with a
j = ak for all j , k ∈ S and every
(bi )i∈S , we have:
||aS − f ((ai )i∈N)|| ≥ ||a
S − f ((ai )i /∈S , (b
i )i∈S)||
Lemma
f is strategy-proof ⇐⇒ f is intermediate strategy-proof
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Literature
Public bads, m = 1
• Peremans and Storcken (1999)
characterization of strategy-proof rules
• Barberà, Berga, and Moreno (2009)
• Manjunath (2009)
more explicit results under more restrictions
• Ehlers (2002)
probabilistic rules with with single-dipped preferences
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Literature
Private bads, m = 1
• Klaus, Peters, and Storcken (1997)
private bads, single-dipped version of Sprumont (1991)
Further
• Literature on ‘value-restrictions’, which include
single-dippedness.
• Inada (1964), Sen and Pattanaik (1969)
In our work
• m = 2, A is a convex polygon including its interior.
• m = 2, A is a disc.
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Convex Polygons
We will consider A as convex polygons with their interiors. First
some remarks and a general result.
• Mainly we will consider profiles with two dips: there exists a
coalition S ⊆ N and points a, b ∈ A such that all agents in S
have point a as their dip and all agents in N\S have point b
as their dip.
• Notation: p = (aS , bN\S ) will be called a conflict.
Lemma: PO implies Outcome is on Boundary
Let A ⊆ Rm with m ≥ 2, p = (aS , bN\S ) be a conflict and f be a
Pareto optimal solution. Then f (p) is a boundary point of A.
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Convex Polygons
Proof of Lemma
Suppose, to the contrary, that f (p) is an interior point of A, i.e.,
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Convex Polygons
Lemma: Outcome is on Boundary implies Outcome is Vertex
Let A ⊆ R2 be a convex polygon with its interior, p be a
single-dipped preference profile, f be Pareto optimal and
strategy-proof solution, and f (p) be on boundary of A. Then f (p)
is a vertex point of A.
Demonstration of Proof
Let A be a pentagon (regular polygon with 5 edges) with its
interior, and p = (aS , bN\S ) be a conflict.
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Convex Polygons





Then by SP and PO: f (āS , bN\S ) = c .
Hence again by SP: f (āS , b̄N\S ) = c .
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Convex Polygons





Then by SP and PO: f (aS , b̄N\S ) = c ′.
Hence again by SP: f (āS , b̄N\S ) = c ′.
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Convex Polygons
Single-Best Locations
• Notation: best(a) = {b ∈ A | d(a, b) ≥ d(a, c) for all c ∈ A}.
• Notation: B = {a ∈ A | best(x) = {a} for some x ∈ A} is set






• best(x) = {a, b, c}, but B = {a, b}.
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Convex Polygons
Lemma: Two Dips Profiles
Let A be a convex polygon with its interior, S ⊆ N, f be a Pareto
optimal and strategy-proof solution, p = (xS , yN\S ) with
a = best(x), b = best(y) and a, b ∈ B. Then f (p) ∈ {a, b}.
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Convex Polygons
• Notation: S ⊆ N is decisive if all agents in coalition S have
some point a ∈ A as their dip in a single-dipped preference
profile p then f (p) ∈ best(a).
• |B| ≥ 3. The case |B| = 2 will be investigated later.
Lemma: Decisive Coalitions
Let A be a convex polygon with its interior, S ⊆ N and f be a
Pareto optimal and strategy-proof solution. Then either S or N\S
is decisive.
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Convex Polygons
Lemma: Intersection of Decisive Coalitions
Let the following conditions hold:
(i) |B| ≥ 3
(ii) there are distinct a, b, c ∈ B, and there is no x ∈ B such that
{a, b, c , x} is rectangular
Let A be a convex polygon with its interior, S ⊆ N and f be a
Pareto optimal and strategy-proof solution. If S and T are both
decisive then S ∩ T is decisive.
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Convex Polygons
Lemma: Set of Decisive Coalitions is Ultrafilter
Let A be a convex polygon with its interior, f be Pareto optimal
and strategy-proof. Then the set of decisive coalitions is an
ultrafilter F
• ∅ /∈ F
• if S ,T ∈ F , then S ∩ T ∈ F for all S ,T ⊆ N
• S ∈ F or N\S ∈ F for all S ⊆ N.
Consequence
There is a unique d ∈ N with {d} ∈ F .
Proof
Otherwise N\{i} is decisive for all i ∈ N. So,
∩{N\{i} : i ∈ N} = ∅ is decisive.
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Convex Polygons
Definition: Dictatorial
Solution f is dictatorial if there exists a d ∈ N, called the dictator,
such that for every profile p we have f (p) ∈ best(a), where a is the
dip of d .
Theorem: Dictatorship on Convex Polygons
Let A be a convex polygon with its interior, except cases |B| = 2
and B is rectangular, and f be a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof
solution. Then f is dictatorial, i.e. there is an agent i ∈ N such
that f (p) ∈ best(p(i)) for all p.
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Convex Polygons: |B| = 2
”Flat” polygons
a b
• W fa = {(S ,U) ∈ N × N | S ∩ U = ∅, f (p) = a for all profiles
p with a is single best for all agents in S and both a and b are
best for all agents in U}.
• W fb = {(T ,U) ∈ N × N | T ∩ U = ∅, f (p) = b for all profiles
p with b is single best for all agents in T and both a and b
are best for all agents in U}.
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Convex Polygons: |B| = 2
The pair (W fa ,W
f
b ) is
• proper and strong: either (S ,U) ∈ W fa or (T ,U) ∈ W
f
b for all
pairwise disjoint sets S ,U and T with S ∪ T ∪ U = N,
• Pareto optimal: (S ,U) ∈ W fa in case S ∪ U = N, and
(T ,U) ∈ W fb in case T ∪ U = N,
• monotone: (S ′,U ′) ∈ W fa whenever (S ,U) ∈ W
f
a , S ⊆ S
′ and
S ∪ U ⊆ S ′ ∪ U ′ and (T ′,U ′) ∈ W fb whenever (T ,U) ∈ W
f
b ,
T ⊆ T ′ and T ∪ U ⊆ T ′ ∪ U ′.
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Convex Polygons: |B| = 2
Definition
f is non-corruptive, if f (p) = f (q) for any profiles p, q with
p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N\{i}, ||p(i)− f (p)|| = ||p(i)− f (q)|| and
||q(i)− f (p)|| = ||q(i)− f (q)||.
Lemma
For any proper, strong, Pareto optimal and monotone pair
(Wa,Wb), there is a Pareto optimal, strategy-proof and
non-corrupt solution f such that Wa = W
f
a and Wb = W
f
b .
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• For a equilateral triangle, domain over vertices is full
• Impossibility result
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• For a ”flat” triangle, domain over vertices is not full
• Non-dictatorial solution: majority voting between a and b
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Convex Polygons: |B| = 4
Rectangular case














Non-dictatorial solution: Choose between UP and DOWN by
majority voting, choose between LEFT and RIGHT by majority
voting.
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Disc
Theorem: Dictatorship on Disc
Let A be a disc, and f be a Pareto optimal and strategy-proof
solution. Then f is dictatorial, i.e. there is an agent i with dip a
such that f (p) ∈ best(a) for all single-dipped preference profile p.
• Intuitively, this result was expected.
• But we did not manage to prove this theorem from the
theorem for convex polygons.
• The proof is quite similar to the proof(s) for convex polygons.
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Summary and Open Questions
Summary
• Let A ⊆ Rm (m ≥ 2) be compact, and let f be a
strategy-proof and Pareto optimal solution for single-dipped
preference profiles. Then f always assigns a boundary point of
A.
• If m = 2 and boundary of A is a convex polygon then f is
dictatorial except two cases.
• For these two cases strategy-proof, Pareto optimal and
non-corruptive solutions are characterized.
• If m = 2 and A is a disc, then f is dictatorial.
Open Questions
• General convex sets?
• More than two dimensions? (m ≥ 3)
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